Abstract-The cycling regime of thermal power plants significantly increases in the presence of intermittent renewables, increasing fuel and operation and maintenance costs from startups. Some regional electricity market operators adopt complex bidding mechanisms to account for nonconvex cost components that are not reflected in the marginal cost of energy, while other markets rely solely on simple bids with revenue sufficiency conditions. This paper compares the impacts of different bidding rules on wholesale prices and on the remuneration of units in power systems with a significant share of renewable generation. We distinguish the effects of bidding rules from the effects of regulatory uncertainty that can unexpectedly increase renewable generation by considering two distinct situations: 1) an "adapted" capacity mix, which is optimized for any given amount of renewable penetration, and 2) a "nonadapted" capacity mix, which is optimized for zero renewable penetration, but operated with different nonzero levels of renewables. We show that, although in the transitory state the impact on remuneration of having a nonadapted system dominates over the effect of the startup remuneration mechanisms explored, in equilibrium, bidding rules play an important role in making power plants whole while impacting on the cost borne by consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
R ENEWABLE integration studies [1] - [4] have shown that cycling of thermal power plants significantly intensifies in the presence of intermittent renewables, 1 increasing fuel and operation and maintenance costs from startup of the thermal units. Many wholesale markets have adopted complex bidding mechanisms to account for nonconvex cost components (those associated with discrete decisions, such as start up or the minimum output requirement) that are not reflected in the marginal cost of energy [5] . Such complementary bidding procedures for instance allow companies to declare their startup costs or to specify a minimum revenue threshold for the day that ensures the cost-recovery of the units. 2 Examples of these different procedures include an energy-based market price where startup costs are paid separately for bids that are accepted (similarly to the PJM market [6] ), a market price that includes an uplift added to the energy component of the price to guarantee the recovery of operating costs (comparable to the Irish market [7] ), and internalizing startup costs in the bid into a single energy term (in a similar way as it is done in general in other European markets [8] ).
Concurrently with the pricing rules for recouping startup costs on market prices, the regulatory uncertainty around 1 Here intermittent refers to the noncontrollable variability and the partial unpredictability of renewable resources, mostly of wind power and solar photovoltaics (PV) [2] . 2 The generation costs to be "recovered" (or not) via market prices include all the operation costs (here only startup costs and fuel costs of electricity production have been considered), plus the capital costs (amortization and a reasonable rate of return on investment). renewable deployment has gained significant attention as a critical factor affecting the profitability of thermal power plants. 3 In most cases, renewable deployment still depends on the existence of subsidies (e.g., feed-in-tariffs or tax credits) or regulatory mandates (e.g., renewable portfolio standards). Unforeseen regulatory changes that affect the deployment pace of renewables can alter the economic equilibrium of the generation fleet. Such regulatory shocks, combined with the short construction time of renewable projects, can quickly displace some thermal generators in the merit order, potentially resulting in partly or totally stranded assets among the thermal generation fleet.
In the context of power systems with renewables, it is particularly relevant to study the mechanisms through which thermal power plants participating in liberalized markets with renewables reflect the costs associated with starting up and the implications of these mechanisms on the surplus of both consumers and generators. The goal of this paper is thus to study the effects of different bidding rules and the regulatory uncertainty around renewable capacity on the total cost recovery of thermal generators and on the cost paid by consumers for the electricity generated.
We use a capacity expansion model with embedded unit commitment constraints to determine the optimal capacity mix for different renewable capacity scenarios, accounting for the impact of the extra costs from intermittency on investment decisions. In addition to deciding on the capacity mix, the model determines the commitment state and the dispatch of the plants, returning the hourly wholesale prices that are calculated based on the bid-forming mechanisms studied. The resulting decisions are used to calculate the remuneration received by each plant in the system and the cost borne by consumers.
Much of the work found in the literature on this topic has been devoted to investigating the short-term impact of renewables on electricity markets, focusing on determining how greater shares of renewables will change wholesale prices and the remuneration of existing plants [9] , [10] , or on how new investments could be incentivized [11] , [12] . Other efforts have been focused on calculating the long-term market equilibrium capacity mix, or quantifying the benefits of elements such as storage or demand response in systems with a high share of renewables [13] , [14] . However, little attention has been paid to studying the interaction between each one of the different bidding mechanisms found in wholesale markets, the renewable penetration level, and the economic losses occurring in a generation fleet that is ill-adapted following an unanticipated addition of renewable capacity to the system. This paper fills this gap by unpacking the interaction between these three elements, explaining their relative influence on the wholesale clearing price and the remuneration of four specific thermal generation technologies: nuclear, coal, combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), and open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs). This paper is structured as follows. First, we present the experimental design used in the study, highlighting the differences between an adapted and a nonadapted system. Second, we describe the method used in the experiments to determine the minimum cost generation fleet, the dispatch, the hourly prices, and the remuneration of the units. We also describe the implementation of the bidding rules studied and the calculation of the plants' profits for each rule. Third, we propose a heuristic method that selectively adds or removes plants based on their expected remuneration to derive an approximate equilibrium solution for the generation fleet, used when the bidding rules overpay or underpay certain technologies. Finally, we present the results of the simulations, show the markedly different implications to generators and to consumers of the bidding rules studied, and present the conclusions.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The proposed experimental design allows for a comparative analysis of the effect of bidding rules under ten different renewable penetration scenarios. In each scenario , wind capacity and solar PV capacity have both been chosen to be equal to GW, where . Although the capacity installed of each renewable technology is the same, their energy contributions will differ, as wind and solar PV have different capacity factors and production patterns.
From optimal marginal pricing theory [15] , under perfect competition (i.e., without market power and with perfect information) the capacity and dispatch solution obtained by maximizing generators' and consumers' welfare based on nonregulated prices is equivalent to the solution obtained through minimizing the total system cost. 4 This result has been used to justify cost minimization formulations in the analysis of perfectly competitive markets, and it will also be used in this analysis to obtain the optimal capacity mix for each renewable scenario, representing the market equilibrium solution.
Pérez-Arriaga and Meseguer [15] also showed that, if technologies are able to adapt and the ideal conditions are satisfied, in equilibrium the profit of all power plants will be exactly zero. Alternatively, if there is a renewable deployment shock in the system, the ensuing excess capacity situation will produce a transition period during which some units in the generation fleet will likely incur losses. In equilibrium, generation is perfectly adapted to renewable deployment and remuneration gaps are exclusively due to the effect of nonconvexities, which allows for the assessment of the performance of bidding rules in recovering total costs. Without equilibrium, the effect of the nonconvexities interacts with the effect of having a nonadapted system. This situation can be useful to estimate the relative effect of the bidding rules under the influence of an unexpected deployment of intermittent renewables. We therefore consider two cases given here.
• Adaptation represents market equilibrium conditions, as simulated by the solution of a capacity expansion model that chooses both investment and operations, accounting for unit commitment constraints and minimizing total system costs. The result of this exercise is a generation fleet that is perfectly adapted to a given renewable capacity .
• Nonadaptation assumes the generation mix that minimizes costs for zero renewable capacity, which then operates in the presence of a given capacity of renewable generation, . Once we have the capacity and operational variables from both cases, we use a price simulator that calculates the wholesale prices under a particular bidding rule (see Section IV) and the cash flows for all the units in the system. The final output of the price simulator, for both the adapted and the nonadapted case, is the average profit for each technology and the average cost to consumers. The resulting experimental design is depicted in Fig. 1 .
Different bidding rules will result in a different balance between producer and consumer surplus. Therefore, bidding rules have to be assessed on the basis of how they affect these two types of agents, measured through two separate metrics, given here.
1) Average profit of technology is obtained by a thermal technology and reflects the extent to which the remuneration obtained by the units exceeds their fixed and variable costs: (1) 2) Average cost to the consumer accounts for the average price paid by consumers, resulting from dividing all of the costs paid by the consumer (excluding those derived from incentive plans to renewable technologies) by the total energy consumed: 5 (2)
III. METHODOLOGY
The operational regime of thermal plants becomes more demanding with greater renewable deployment as a consequence of a more variable net load. The technical constraints that were typically ignored in generation planning models [16] (minimum required output of the units, output ramping limits, minimum up and down times, and startup costs) become binding and must be incorporated into the model to account for their effect on the system cost.
A. Modeling Technique
We use IMRES 6 a centralized capacity expansion model with detailed unit commitment constraints embedded [17] to account for the impact of nonconvex costs on investment decisions. In each case, the model chooses both the investments in capacity needed in the system and the hourly commitment and generation schedule of all units to meet demand at minimum cost. The objective function in IMRES minimizes the total cost of the system, which is the sum of investment and operating costs, including the cost of nonserved energy (see (14) in Appendix). A full description of IMRES can be found in [17] and a shorter description is included in the Annex.
B. Selection of Sample Weeks
The dimensionality of a formulation like the one proposed, combining investment decisions at the individual plant level and a unit commitment spanning one full year, is of the order of , where is the number of power plants considered by the model. For a real-sized system, if is on the order of hundreds, the dimensionality and the number of binary variables becomes prohibitive for current computers and solvers.
We simplify the problem by using a set of representative weeks in the unit commitment component of the model that approximate the inter-hour variability of the net load over the year while reducing the dimensionality of the problem. The energy produced by the plants and the operating cost derived from the unit commitment are then scaled up by a factor of , where is the total number of hours selected in the approximation; and is a vector containing the indices of the weeks selected. For instance, if , the approximation is built with the second, 24th, 32nd, and 51st weeks.
In this analysis, for a scenario given by its renewable penetration level , we choose the four weeks that minimize the sum of squared errors between the net load duration curve and its approximation . For a chronological series of demand and renewable generation, the net load duration curve is the difference between demand and renewable generation, ordered decreasingly. If we choose the maximum output parameter of renewable plants to be equal to 1 GW 1 GW , then the gigawatts of wind and solar capacity installed in the system can be expressed as and , respectively. The can thus be obtained by sorting the difference between the demand and the 6 IMRES stands for Investment Model for Renewable Electricity Systems. renewable output in decreasing order as follows:
The vector of weeks used to build the approximation is thus given by the solution of the following optimization problem: (3) This method guarantees that the weeks selected best represent the energy below the , but it does not explicitly account for the chronological variability of the net load. Still, sensitivity analyses conducted on the number of weeks selected to construct the approximation and a thorough comparison of the commitment results produced by the approximation and the full year net load series show that, for the 4-week approximation ( , the errors are small both in terms of energy and in terms of commitment results (less than 3% in terms of capacity factor and energy contribution, and less than 10% of total startups) [18] .
C. Value of Lost Load
The value of lost load is an important parameter in capacity expansion problems, as it reflects the price that will be paid to generators during times of scarcity. In this analysis we assume that backup generators can participate in demand response mechanisms, such that the is equal to the variable cost of these generators (500 $/MWh in this analysis). In addition, we assume that there is no other security of supply mechanism in the system other than the , which also represents the system marginal cost of security of supply. Therefore, the decides on the maximum generation capacity installed in the system and on the total amount of nonserved energy, which will be non-negligible and will contribute to the cost recovery of the plants in the system.
IV. BIDDING RULE IMPLEMENTATION
Bidding rules govern the structure of the bid functions submitted by the generators to electricity day-ahead auctions (i.e., the economic and technical conditions that are acceptable by generators in order to generate), influencing the market clearing price used to compensate generators for the energy delivered. Simple bids are price-quantity pairs that a generating unit is willing to accept as a fair compensation for producing electricity. Simple bids, however, do not explicitly represent the nonconvex components of cost, such as startup costs and no-load costs. As a consequence, generators are forced to internalize those cost items in the simple bid or, plants bid their actual marginal cost of energy and the market operator applies other mechanisms that allow plants to recover other costs. Alternatively, complex bids (also referred to as complimentary bids) are mechanisms that allow producers to explicitly reflect the nonconvex components of their cost structure in the bid.
Once all the bids have been received, the market operator centrally decides upon the commitment state and quantity dispatched of all the units participating in the auction, typically running a security-constrained unit commitment in the case of com-plex bids, and a straightforward matching of supply and demand curves in the case of simple bids. However, for the purpose of determining the generation mix and the minimum cost unit commitment and dispatch, it will be assumed that these decisions are centralized and the resulting generation mix, unit commitment and dispatch are optimal in the sense of minimizing costs. In principle, it is conceptually legitimate to assume that a perfectly competitive market and a centrally-planned system will result in the same generation expansion and operation, when all cost information is available to the decision maker 7 [15] . This paper examines why the choice of bidding rules may create a discrepancy and its quantitative relevance. Therefore, in our experiments, the generation mix and the operation of generating plants will be identical and the only difference between the cases is the way by which wholesale prices are determined.
The bidding rules studied (with the exception of the simple bids case) are based on the dual variable of the demand balance equation 8 (4)
A. Do Nothing
The "do nothing" strategy represents a naive approach to bidding, ignoring the nonconvex costs. The wholesale market price is , and the profitability of units is the difference between the remuneration obtained from energy sales and the sum of fixed costs and operating costs: (5) We use the results obtained from this strategy as comparison to quantify the effect produced by the subsequent bidding rules analyzed.
B. Side Payment
Some power systems like PJM and NY-ISO include a revenue sufficiency guarantee condition to ensure that power plants scheduled in the day-ahead and real-time markets recover their daily offer amounts. In this case, the price is equal to the marginal cost of energy , and there is a side payment that guarantees that plants recover their operating costs.
Side payments are allocated by looking at the difference between remuneration and operating costs on a daily basis. If we define an index for the days included in the time series, the operating costs of power plant incurred in day , , are given by (6) where denotes the subset of hours in day
We then assign a side payment equal to the difference between operating costs and energy remuneration, to plants where this difference is positive. This mechanism ensures that plants are not overpaid when operating costs have already been recovered with energy sales as follows:
if if
The yearly profit of individual plants is equal to the difference between remuneration (including the side payments received) and cost: (9)
C. Price Uplift
The Irish market is another example of a centrally dispatched system where generators bid their actual short-run marginal cost. However, the Irish bidding code of practice [7] contemplates an addition to the price of an hourly uplift, denoted here as , that is calculated on a daily basis to guarantee that all plants recover their operating costs. The resulting hourly system marginal price then becomes the sum of the marginal cost of energy and the hourly uplift:
. The calculation of the uplift is performed ex-post of the daily unit commitment, for all , fixing the variables resulting from the unit commitment and minimizing the cost of the uplift, and is subject to the constraint that all online power plants recover their operating costs: (10) Similar to the side payment rule, price uplifts compensate for nonconvex cost items that are not necessarily covered by the marginal cost of energy . However, in contrast to the side payment, the hourly uplift will affect the remuneration of all of the online units. Another characteristic of this approach is the frequent presence of "price spikes" as a consequence of adding the uplift on top of the price.
The resulting profit of individual plants is the difference between energy revenues obtained with the system marginal price and the sum of all fixed and variable costs given as ( 
11) D. Simple Bids
In the absence of a separate remuneration mechanism like the ones used in PJM, NY-ISO or Ireland, auctions based on simple bids remunerate plants based solely on the wholesale price, forcing plants to internalize in the simple bid all nonconvex costs incurred by the plant. We implement this procedure by adding to the power plant's variable cost the average of the startup costs incurred by the plant over the course of one day, evenly distributed over the hours of operation of the plant: (12) Note that, as indicated earlier, the plant dispatch resulting from this simple bidding does not have to coincide necessarily with the minimum cost unit commitment, where nonconvex operation costs are considered explicitly.
The annual profit of individual plants is the difference between the revenues from the energy produced and the sum of fixed and operating costs given as (13) V. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM HEURISTIC METHOD With adaptation, units expecting to make negative profits under a certain bidding rule would not be installed in the first place. The opposite can occur if bidding rules overcompensate some technologies,andthereisapositiveprofitexpectationfornewentrants. In fact, in a market equilibrium solution where all power plants recover their costs, no new entrant would make positive profits.
We propose here a set of rules to iterate on the welfare-maximizing generation fleet under a certain bidding rule until we obtain an approximation to the market equilibrium solution. This heuristic method screens all of the technologies and adds or removes one unit repeatedly, until the profits of every individual unit are positive and no new units can be added that would make a profit. The technology screening is performed in an increasing variable cost fashion, because plants that are lower in the merit order (i.e., lower marginal costs) have a greater impact on the energy delivered by units that are higher in the merit order. The resulting capacity change for a given technology , expressed in number of units, is denoted as . A detailed description of the algorithm for this heuristic is provided in Fig. 2 .
We apply this heuristic method to bidding rules yielding average profit solutions outside the 10% and 10% bounds with the adapted capacity mix. Solutions with average profits within these bounds oscillate between the adapted capacity mix and a capacity mix with 1 plants, and they are considered in practice equilibrium solutions. 9 The results from applying this heuristic are shown in Section VI.
VI. RESULTS
We apply our analysis to a system with 77 GW of peak demand and geographically diversified renewable resources, which enables renewable production to be scaled for a given 9 The oscillation is originated in the nonconvex costs of the system, the lumpiness of the plants, and the fact that the number of hours with NSE in is multiple of the weighting factor . The sum of these three factors increases the divergence between the profits in the equilibrium solution and the zero-profit level. renewable capacity based on the historical capacity factor of wind and solar resources. We start from a greenfield situation and decide on the individual generating units required to satisfy the demand at minimum cost. Table I displays the profit and cost to consumers results from all of the experiments conducted, disaggregated by adaptation case, bidding rule applied, and renewable scenario. Fig. 3 shows that more renewable generation shifts the optimal generation mix towards having more flexible plants 10 with low fixed costs (CCGTs and OCGTs), displacing technologies traditionally considered as baseload. This is primarily driven by how the shape of the net load duration curve changes as renewable capacity grows, as well as by the technical limitations of baseload technologies in the face of a more demanding operational regime. Fig. 4 displays the resulting amount of nonserved energy with the "adapted" and the "nonadapted" systems for the different renewable scenarios analyzed. With the "adapted" system, the amount of nonserved energy is on the order of 0.1%. This result is directly related to the used in the experiment: higher values of lost load would have resulted in lower values of nonserved energy and vice versa. There is an ascending trend for higher renewable penetration levels, although the evolution is nonmonotonic because different weeks and approximations are used to model different renewable scenarios. For the "nonadapted" system the amount of nonserved energy is equal to zero, reflecting the excess capacity when renewables are added on top of a system that is already adequate to supply the demand. Fig. 3 . Evolution of the thermal capacity installed and the actual renewable energy contribution with greater renewable capacity installed. Fig. 4 . Evolution of the nonserved energy for 500/ MWh expressed in terms of the total energy demand in the system, for the "adapted" and the "nonadapted" systems.
A. Impact on Cost Recovery
In the nonadapted case, there are technology differential effects that can be further disaggregated into three components: 1) a price reduction derived from a reduction of the net demand; 2) a price increase from having more frequent nonconvex costs impacting marginal prices; and 3) an energy output reduction as some units will see part of their energy production displaced by renewable generation. Here, technologies with high variable cost will be more likely to be displaced than technologies with a low variable cost.
In the adapted case, the average profit values in the "do nothing" case are negative as a result of remuneration not reflecting the nonconvex parts of the cost and the lumpiness of the plants. If we compare these results with those obtained with the nonadapted system, we observe that the magnitude of the remuneration gap for all technologies caused by having a nonadapted system significantly outweighs the gap caused by not remunerating startup costs with the adapted system.
The "side payment" and the "price uplift" bidding rules guarantee that under adaptation all plants recover operating costs, but the "price uplift" rule helps all technologies towards recovering their total costs as the nonconvex costs reflected in the uplift are added to the marginal price. We illustrate in Fig. 5 the average profit for each thermal technology considered and for the first three bidding rules analyzed. Under adaptation, the "simple bids" rule yields profits significantly greater than zero, leading to a situation that may attract new entrants to the market. 11 Therefore, we apply the heuristic method described before to this case to obtain a market equilibrium approximation. We consider only investments in additional CCGT or OCGT units, as results indicate that greater renewable capacity would shift the mix towards more gas-fired plants. Table II shows in parentheses the number of new plants added after applying the heuristic.
results show that by letting plants reach a market equilibrium, we reduce the cost to consumers. However, they also reveal that, in equilibrium, the solution from using simple bids produces a situation of excess capacity where plants are still overcompensated. Fig. 6 shows the impact of renewable capacity on the average cost paid by consumers . 12 We observe a significant divergence between the results from the adaptation and the nonadaptation cases, as in the nonadaptation case renewables are forced into a system that is already designed to cover the demand by itself, creating a situation of excess-capacity. Renewables thus displace the most expensive plants, reduce the marginal cost of energy, and reduce the number of hours with nonserved energy, ultimately decreasing the wholesale price of electricity.
B. Impact on the Cost to Consumers
In the adapted cases, we observe that although tends to be lower with greater values of renewable capacity, the decline is less steep than in the nonadaptation cases. We also note that with the 'do-nothing' rule and with a 'side-payment' are both very similar, and that bidding rules that add an uplift increase the cost to consumers by about 8% of the initial value. Simple bids impose a much greater burden on the consumer, on the order of 35% greater than the 'do-nothing' case. The explanation for this greater cost to the consumer is that the average startup cost that is added on top of the plant's variable cost to form the price bid (12) reaches very high values when plants start up to produce a small amount of electricity. This effect increases the electricity price seen by consumers, which also justifies the higher profits obtained with the 'simple bid' rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
We use a capacity expansion model with embedded unit commitment constraints to explore the impact of bidding rules in power systems with large shares of wind and solar PV, under two adaptation situations: a fully adapted generation fleet, optimized for the renewable scenario; and a fleet optimized for zero renewables operated with a given nonzero renewable capacity.
We find that bidding rules meant to ensure that plants recover nonconvex operation costs have significant implications in the overall cost recovery of the generation plants and the price paid by consumers. First, granting a side payment to power plants that do not have their operating costs covered by the wholesale price can bring them closer to full-cost recovery at very small cost to the consumers, but may fail to recover the total generation costs of the different technologies. Second, adding the optimal price uplift that allows all plants to recover operating costs increases the profits of all units, as startups increase the energy price through the uplift, which has a larger impact on the consumer and still may under-recover total generation costs. Third, allowing for the internalization of startup costs in simple bids grants plants revenues that exceed their total cost, creating opportunities for new entrants and imposing an unnecessary burden on the consumer. In general, these effects can be interpreted as shifts from consumers to producers surplus, with an inefficiency in the 'simple bids' case as there is more capacity installed than what is optimal.
In addition, we explored the relative effects of bidding rules when there is an unanticipated deployment of renewables that affects the economic equilibrium of the system. Under this circumstance, an excess-capacity situation is created and generators incur losses in income due to a quick depression of wholesale prices and a reduction of their capacity factor, as a fraction of the demand is taken over by renewables. We found this welfare loss on the side of the producer to be significantly greater than those incurred from not reflecting startup costs in the bids. This result underlines the importance of having renewable energy plans that allow market players to adapt without incurring losses provoked by potential regulatory shocks.
APPENDIX A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF IMRES: A CAPACITY EXPANSION FORMULATION WITH UNIT COMMITMENT CONSTRAINTS

A. Indices and Variables
Two indices are used in IMRES:
, where denotes the set of generating units that can be potentially built, and , where denotes the set of hours in a year (or, alternatively, the total number of hours contained in the weeks sampled). The subset includes the units of all thermal generation technologies; the subset denotes the subset of wind units; and the subset denotes the subset of solar units. 
B. Objective Function
The objective function minimizes the total cost of the system, which is the sum of investment and operating costs, including the cost of nonserved energy: (14)
C. Operational Constraints
The model includes the most important operation constraints in unit commitment formulations. Demand balance: (15) Commitment and maximum and minimum output constraints, minimum output requirement: 
